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Joined 2 years ago
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Cake day: October 28th, 2024

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  • Nobody believes virtualization is perfect, it’s just the best we got because:

    • smaller attack surface
    • security is the priority over adding new features (the opposite of most other development cycles)
    • in practice we have seen how secure it is relative to other systems like the kernel

    And anyways, even a separate physical computer can be hacked. If it has networking, there could be a vulnerability in the networking stack. Just making an outbound tcp connection can be enough to be pwned.

    I think the closest thing we have to an “invincible” system is seL4, but I rarely hear about amybody using them


  • copy fail allows VMs to infect the host system? I thought it was a kernel vulnerability, not a hypervisor vulnerability. Containers and LXCs share the kernel with the host, full VMs do not. So a kernel exploit allows container escape but not VM escape.

    Kernel exploits happen a few times a year. Hypervisor exploits and VM escapes are VERY rare.

    Using SSH for clustering is optional. You can just use normal VMs. You don’t have to install SSH into the VM, you can view it through proxmox. The only difference between a VM and a separate physical machine is the hypervisor, so the only security difference is the security of the hypervisor. And as I mentioned, hypervisor exploits are very rare.

    Edit: for a sense of perspective, think about this. Almost every major tech company in the world relies on hypervisors for security. Qubes OS, known in the privacy/security world as one of if not the most secure OSes, relies on the hypervisor for security. An easily exploitable hypervisor escape would be a vulnerability on the scale of the XZ utils backdoor (which was unsuccessful). I have not seen a vulnerability of that scale since heartbleed.

    Edit2: a word




  • Even if you have a password for your ssh key, malware on your system can just wait until you enter the password.

    My point is that SSH access is very powerful, and effectively means that the security of the SSH server is reduced to the security of the SSH client. If your SSH client is pwned, so is your server. If you have 10 devices each with ssh access to each other, then if any one device is pwned, all devices are pwned as well.

    This is not the case for systems designed for file sharing only. For example with syncthing, if one device gets pwned, all it can do is send files to the other devices.








  • ok first off, this community is about self-hosting, there just happens to be a lot of overlap between people who self-host and people who care about privacy.

    And if you thought privacy was about distrust, that is a very unhealthy view. Privacy-minded folk simply have different principles than the mainstream. But if somebody comes along that shares those principles, then trust can be earned.

    OP’s product is open-source and self-hostable. This is aligned with the community. I’m not saying to throw money at the product before it’s released, but it’s worth keeping an eye on, and showing support for.






  • These comments are why privacy products will always be behind. Why open-source is full of dead projects. These people are just trying to make a living off making privacy-focused products. And all the comments are like “They’re a for-profit company? They had marketing material prepped to reply to people’s comments?!”.

    The code is open-source, self-hostable, built using commodity hardware (raspi), and they’re just trying to make it sustainable by providing an optional paid service. This is not the enemy.